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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001615

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TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER PHUM PINR

SUBJECT: ANP COALITION PARTNER ASFANDYAR WALI KHAN COMMENTS
ON S. WAZIRISTAN DEAL

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1586
B. ISLAMABAD 1609
C. ISLAMABAD 1614

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S) Summary: On April 18, Peshawar Principal Officer Lynne Tracy followed up with Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandiyar Wali Khan a

2. (S) Commenting on Chief of Army Staff Kayani, he thought the General had so far played a "positive role." Khan suggested that the USG
Lastly, he recommended that tribal leaders from border areas on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line be allowed to return home to lead the
New South Waziristan Agreement

3. (S) Peshawar Principal Officer (PO) Lynne Tracy met April 18 in Islamabad with GOP coalition partner Awami National Party (ANP) leader As

4. (S) Khan informed the PO that a draft agreement was presented by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani at a security briefing

5. (S) Khan argued that this agreement was different from the one in 2006 with North Waziristan, with which he vehemently disagreed; this ti
of a signatory tribe could be used to harbor foreign fighters. "We will be the first to know if the agreement is violated," Khan claimed.

6. (S) The PO expressed the USG's deep skepticism that this latest agreement would not be misused by the militants to re-group and plan for
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under the circumstances." Khan was quick to reiterate that the ANP did not author this agreement, implying that the military had drafted

7. (S) "We want dialogue," so long as the militants first give up their guns and "state action" always remains an option, Khan said. As

8. (S) PO questioned how weakened South Waziristani tribal leaders would take on militant leader Baitullah Mehsud.
Mehsud was in South Waziristan only every three to four months, Khan said. He maintained that Mehsud had taken refuge in North Waziristan wi

9. (S) The GOP (and West) needed to enlist local tribal leaders to turn the tide against extremism, Khan commented.
The ANP leader advocated finding "more Maulana Nazir's." (Comment: Nazir is the South Waziristani militant who was part of the Pakistani mi
The Kayani Connection

10. (S) Responding to the PO's questions as to the exact role of the military in drafting this deal, Khan commented that Kayani's "body lar
11. (S) Khan said that Kayani had so far played a "positive role" when he took over ISI, closing six militant training camps identified
The Way Forward

12. (S) Khan said that, if the USG could advocate for any policy initiatives with the GOP, he recommended: (1) FATA security/policing be t
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13. (S) Khan provided the broad outlines of an ANP's comprehensive plan for donors that would focus on strengthening local security forces

14. (S) Khan wanted to avoid ad hoc projects. Recognizing that the European Union was more hesitant to work in the FATA, because of secur
Trouble Further North

15. (S) Khan expressed concern about Afghanistan's northern border province of Kunar, noting the "fierce resistance" by militants there

16. (U) Khan will leave April 24 for official meetings in Washington.

17. (S) Comment: While the latest agreement in South Waziristan follows the political solution outlined by ANP, Khan seemed somewhat hesit
End comment.

PATTERSON